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Buckwalter and Tillman: LeMay

provides global connectivity, are secret
wars still possible? Not according to the
author of Safe for Democracy: The Secret
Wars of the CIA.
Veteran intelligence and policy writer
John Prados provides a detailed, if somewhat disjointed, chronology of CIA covert actions since the inception of the
agency. Prados describes the most recent
chapters in the long history of U.S. covert actions, dividing covert actions into
two types: political actions (including
propaganda and psychological operations) and paramilitary operations. Covert
and clandestine intelligence collections
are addressed only peripherally, often
when covert action and collection must
be weighed against one another.
Prados focuses on several common
threads. He describes the rivalries
within the CIA between the proponents
of political and paramilitary operations,
and between covert operations and
clandestine intelligence collections. He
also discusses the competition between
the rival “baronies” of the regional divisions within the agency’s Directorate of
Operations. The author generally takes
a negative view of covert actions, maintaining (for the most part) that they are
antithetical to American ideals. With
more justification, he points out that
covert actions rarely lead to permanent
solutions.
However, Prados makes several excellent points that are often overlooked.
First, CIA covert actions are carried out
on the orders of the president. The
varying degrees of control between different administrations, and the relationship between the president and his
Director of Central Intelligence, are key
factors that determine both the degree
of autonomy given to the agency and
the amount of operational detail a
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president receives. Even when given a
high degree of autonomy, the CIA has
operated under presidential guidance.
Second, Prados points out that from the
start it was impossible to keep covert
actions totally secret. Many of the operations discussed (such as the Bay of
Pigs, Angola, and in Southeast Asia)
could not be accomplished on that scale
today. Most importantly, Prados argues
that covert actions are a poor substitute
for policy.
At the end of this long and detailed
book, the reader is left feeling that something is missing. The author’s treatment
is not balanced, and one wonders if
other viewpoints would tell a different
story. Still, this is a valuable book for
students of intelligence activities.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia

Tillman, Barrett. LeMay. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007. 205pp. $21.95

Some great leaders are remembered
only as a caricature, and General Curtis
E. LeMay may be the epitome of this
unfortunate tendency. Mention LeMay,
and many see only the movie character
General “Buck” Turgidson in the 1964
film Dr. Strangelove. Barrett Tillman’s
balanced and concise depiction of
LeMay puts this limited (and largely inaccurate) view into context. More importantly, he retrieves some of the
enduring lessons of leadership that can
be learned from one of America’s greatest airmen.
This is precisely the intent of Palgrave
Macmillan’s “Great Generals” series.
These books—titles on Patton, Grant,
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Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Stonewall
Jackson have already appeared—are designed to be “quick reads,” of as much
interest to the general public as to the
military history buff. The work under
review treats an important leader who
may be in particular need of some rehabilitation, and it is a great advertisement for the entire series. In a single
day’s reading one can dispel many of
the “Strangelovian” myths and appreciate the man, the leader, and the timeless
leadership lessons his example provides.
Tillman skillfully blends elements from
LeMay’s personal and professional lives
with the historical, providing a remarkably nuanced appreciation for this
greatest of bomber generals. Any reader
can profit from this comprehensive account; for instance, any reader familiar
with the classic film Twelve O’clock
High will recognize that a good bit of
LeMay went into Gregory Peck’s character, Brigadier General Frank Savage.
But even the most serious student of
military history is likely to learn something new about LeMay’s life and times.
Tillman’s portrayal of LeMay, however,
is not solely complimentary. While he
obviously has great appreciation and
admiration for his subject, he is also
frank about LeMay’s shortcomings. He
admits that LeMay was much more effective as a commander and operator in
the field than in Washington, D.C., as
vice chief and then chief of staff of the
Air Force. Tillman also calls LeMay’s
decision to run for vice president in
George Wallace’s independent party bid
of 1968 “disastrous for his reputation,”
although he finds any conclusion that
LeMay himself was a racist “demonstrably false.” In sum, LeMay offers a balanced description of the general and his
leadership.
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LeMay’s insights into leadership are still
useful today. The “bedrock of his leadership was professional competence.” He
was known as the premier pilot, navigator, and bombardier in all his early
bomber commands. Throughout the
book, LeMay’s emphasis on competence, accountability to high standards,
teamwork, developing subordinates,
and communication come through
loud and clear. Tillman uses LeMay’s
own words as his final word on leadership: “No matter how well you apply
the art of leadership, no matter how
strong your unit, or how high the morale of your men, if your leadership is
not directed completely toward the
mission, your leadership has failed . . .
[in a single word, leadership is]
Responsibility.”
It is one thing to describe the principles
of leadership. It is quite another to understand how the great leaders in history have lived and applied those
principles. Barrett Tillman’s excellent
narrative salvages both LeMay and his
timeless lessons for today’s leaders.
DAVID BUCKWALTER

Naval War College

Davis, Lance E., and Stanley L. Engerman. Naval
Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History
since 1750. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,
2006. 325pp. $85

As its title states, this book is an economic history examining the impact of
naval blockades in general, but it really
focuses on four major wars since 1750:
the Napoleonic Wars (including the
War of 1812), the American Civil War,
World War I, and World War II (including the U.S. blockade of Japan).
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